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The current account surplus of the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea) increased 
significantly in the immediate recovery period after the 1997–1998  Asian financial crisis. 
Since then the surplus has gradually diminished, and from 2006 to 2008, the current account 
was close to being balanced. Econometric analysis reveals that the effect of exchange rate 
changes on Korea's trade is not robust during non-crisis periods. Exchange rates only 
significantly affect trade when observations during crisis periods are included. This suggests 
that exchange rate adjustments alone will not solve the imbalance issue. Korea's external 
imbalances are not only  caused by external factors;  they  also reflect internal and policy 
factors such as: (i) saving-investment imbalances; (ii) export-oriented policies; and (iii) the 
unbalanced structure of manufacturing and services. These internal imbalances result from 
domestic distortions and structural imbalances arising from market inefficiencies and public 









1.  INTRODUCTION 
The state of the world's current account imbalances still poses the risk of sparking another 
financial crisis. Prior to the current global economic turmoil, there was widespread concern 
that a “disorderly unwinding” of growing global imbalances would lead to a crisis. In the end, 
these imbalances did not directly cause the financial crisis that unraveled in 2008. Instead, 
the primary causes were inadequate financial market regulation and lax monetary policy in 
industrialized countries,  particularly in the United States (US). Such an environment 
encouraged overspending in the US, which was financed by excess saving from other parts 
of the world.  
The current global turmoil is nevertheless underpinned by global current account 
imbalances, for which Asia is partly responsible. Indeed, Asia’s aggregate current account 
surpluses have been rising sharply since 2003. The region therefore has a responsibility to 
reduce its share of the global imbalance and lessen the risk of another economic crisis. 
Addressing the issue of Asia's current account imbalances, however, requires a better 
understanding of the causes. 
Global imbalances have been mainly driven by the large current account deficits of the US, 
and the corresponding surpluses in the rest of the world, including developing Asia (Figure 
1). Asia's current account surpluses increased rapidly after the 1997–1998 Asian financial 
crisis, as a result of declining domestic demand. Investment rates fell sharply in the crisis-hit 
economies as well as in the region’s newly industrialized economies (Lee and McKibbin 
2007). 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2009, (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=29). 
External imbalances are not just an external problem, and should not be judged solely by 
their size. In open economies,  current account imbalances can naturally emerge from 
country-specific macroeconomic and financial factors; as long as the imbalances reflect 
economic fundamentals, these cannot be considered “bad”. However,  current account ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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imbalances can also result from internal microeconomic imbalances, or domestic distortions 
caused by market inefficiencies or public policies (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2009). The 
domestic saving-investment imbalance, as well as policies on export orientation, exchange 
rates, and reserve management, can all have  an  impact on external imbalances. These 
internal factors suggest that exchange rate adjustments alone will not bring about balanced 
growth. Rather, a structural approach would be needed to address the fundamental source 
of imbalances. 
This paper focuses on the experience of the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea), and 
assesses the underlying reasons for the country's current account imbalances. Korea was 
hit hard by the global crisis, yet its contribution to the global imbalance problem has been 
relatively small,  even insignificant. Korea’s net exports averaged a mere  1.1% of gross 
domestic product (GDP) from 2005 to 2008, and while its foreign exchange reserves did 
increase from US$52.0 billion (14.6% of GDP) in 1998 to US$200.5 billion (21.5% of GDP) in 
2008 (Figure 2), this still accounted for only 2.9% of total global reserves in 2008. 

























Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents Korea's current account imbalances, 
focusing on trends, determinants, and composition. Sections 3 to 5 focus on the different 
factors which have contributed to Korea's external imbalance problem, i.e., savings and 
investment imbalances, export-led growth, and internal imbalances between manufacturing 
and services. Section 6 lays out the policy agenda for rebalancing the country’s growth. 
2.  CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES IN KOREA 
2.1  Current account trends    
Korea’s current account changed dramatically after the  1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. 
Between 1980 and 1996, the current account had an average deficit amounting to 0.32% of 
GDP, with a standard deviation of 1.82 (using quarterly data). Between  1999  and  2009, 
however, the current account shifted to an average surplus amounting to 1.99% of GDP, 
with a standard deviation of 2.17 (Table 1). There was greater volatility in the post-crisis 
period, particularly if data for 1997 and 1998 are included. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Current Account Balance as a Percentage of GDP 
  1980Q1-2009Q3  1980Q1-1996Q4  1999Q1-2009Q3 
Mean  0.83  -0.32  1.99 
Median  0.34  -0.65  1.90 
Max  11.99  4.11  6.97 
Min  -4.28  -4.08  -3.57 
Std. Dev.  2.83  1.82  2.17 
Note: quarterly data is used. 
Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
Given such volatility, it is difficult to tell if the recent surplus in the current account will be 
permanent. Indeed, Korea’s current account surplus began  narrowing in  1999, when the 
foreign exchange crisis ended, and continued to do so until 2007. There was even a brief 
return to a current account deficit in the first three quarters of 2008.  
The drastic depreciation in the Korean won and the rapid contraction in domestic demand 
following the 2008 global financial crisis put the current account back into surplus by the 
fourth quarter of 2008. Estimates for 2009 suggest a vast surplus amounting to 5.3% of 
GDP, due to large surpluses in the goods and services accounts. The massive slowdown in 
exports was outweighed by an even sharper deceleration in imports, as Korean firms and 
consumers cut back on spending.  
Nonetheless, if we look at the 5-year moving average of the current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP and smooth out the annual volatilities, it would be premature to say that 
this dramatic widening in the surplus signals a departure from the overall narrowing trend 
(Figure 3). It may well be that the 2009 surplus is temporary, and merely repeating trends in 
the immediate years after the Asian financial crisis.  ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
2.2  Determinants of Korea’s current account 
Korea’s current account seems to be correlated with major economic variables such as 
exchange rates, national GDP, and world GDP. To determine the exact magnitude of the 
effects of these variables, we conducted econometric analyses using dynamic ordinary least 
squares method. 
Specifically, we set up the following models for exports and imports. Equation (1) is for 
exports, where the  real effective exchange rate and world GDP are the determinants. 




t t t reer j t j wgdp j t j t
jp jp
ex reer wgdp reer wgdp u αβ β β β −−
=−=−
= + + + ∆+ ∆ + ∑∑     (1) 
12 , ,
pp
t t t reer j t j gdp j t j t
jp jp
im reer gdp reer gdp u αβ β β β −−
=−=−
= + + + ∆+ ∆+ ∑∑     (2) 
Here, ex is export volumes, im is import volumes, reer is real effective exchange rate, wgdp 
is world GDP, and gdp is Korea’s GDP. All variables are in natural logs and use quarterly 
data from various sources.
1
The results for Equation (1) are summarized in Table 2. Column (1) is the specification for 
Equation (1) with the full sample. The results show that Korea’s exports are significantly 
correlated with exchange rates and world GDP, as predicted by economic theory. However, 
the  coefficient of the exchange rate, or the exchange rate elasticity of exports, is much 
 Equations (1) and (2) are estimated with p = 2. 
                                                 
1 The data for Korea’s export volumes, import volumes, and GDP have been obtained from the Bank of Korea 
Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). Real effective exchange rates for Korea, 
Dubai crude oil prices, and world GDP growth rates have been obtained from Bloomberg, and real effective 
exchange rates for Japan from the IFS database.  ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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smaller (-0.16) than that of world GDP (3.44). This means that a one percent depreciation in 
the real effective exchange rate will increase Korea’s exports by 0.16%
2
Table 2: Determinants of Korea’s Exports 
, whereas a one 
percent increase in world GDP will increase Korea’s exports by 3.44% 
  Full sample  Non-crisis periods only 
  (1)  (2) 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  -11.74***  -28.54  -8.14***  -4.36 
Real effective exchange rate  -0.16**  -1.97  -0.01  -0.02 
World GDP  3.44***  49.65  2.52***  3.76 
Adjusted r-squared  0.9847    0.9838   
Sample (adjusted)  1996Q4 - 2009Q2  2000Q4 - 2007Q2 
# of observations  51    27   
Note: *** denotes significance level of 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, respectively. Coefficients on differences and lagged 
differences are not shown in the table.  
Source: Authors' calculations.  
Overall, these results may have been influenced by drastic changes in the variables during 
the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. If one 
considers a stable period, the same econometric model would give a totally different picture. 
Column (2) in Table 2 shows the results for Equation (1) for the non-crisis period covering 
2000Q4–2007Q2. For this sample, the effect of the exchange rate on exports has virtually no 
significance, while world GDP has a strong effect.
3
Table 3 shows similar results for imports: while the real effective exchange rate and GDP are 
generally important determinants, the exchange rate elasticity is much smaller than the 
income elasticity. Column (1) corresponds to Equation (2) with the full sample. The results 
show that a one percent appreciation in Korea's real effective exchange rate raises imports 
by 0.59%, while a one percent increase in Korea's GDP raises imports by 1.55%. Moreover, 
as seen in Column (2), the effect of the exchange rate again becomes insignificant if one 
considers the non-crisis period.
 During this non-crisis period, the Korean 
won appreciated without reducing the pace of export growth.  
4
                                                 
2  While a depreciation in the real effective exchange rate increases real exports, the impact of the nominal 
exchange rate on exports would also depend on the magnitude of exchange rate pass-through, that is, the 
extent to which exporters change export prices in response to exchange rate. 
 During the non-crisis period, exchange rate appreciation did 
not increase domestic demand;  the share of private consumption declined continuously, 
regardless of the direction of the won’s value (Figure 4). 
3  We also considered the real effective exchange rate of the Japanese yen as an additional determinant of 
Korea's exports. The coefficient of Korea's real effective exchange rate, reer, increased to -0.43 in the 
estimation with the full sample, but remained insignificant in the non-crisis sample. 
4  The Dubai crude oil price was also considered as an additional determinant of Korea's imports. The coefficient 
of Korea's real effective exchange rate, reer, increased to 0.40 in the estimation with the full sample, but 
remained insignificant in the non-crisis sample. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
 
7 
Table 3: Determinants of Korea’s Imports 
 
  Full sample  Non-crisis periods only 
  (1)  (2) 
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  -17.16***  -29.49  -19.47***  -10.97 
Real effective exchange rate  0.59***     6.76  0.14     0.49 
GDP  1.55***  43.66  1.91***  8.22 
Adjusted r-squared  0.9763    0.9516   
Sample (adjusted)  1996Q1 - 2009Q1  2000Q4 - 2007Q2 
# of observations  53    27   
Note: *** denotes significance level of 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%, respectively. Coefficients on differences and lagged 
differences are not shown in the table.  
Source: Authors' calculations. 
 



























Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
These results suggest that exchange rates may not have a significantly meaningful impact 
on exports and imports in Korea; however, immense shocks such as financial crises do 
affect net exports. Moreover, the magnitude of the  exchange rate elasticity is smaller 
compared  to  variables such as world GDP or Korea’s own GDP. These results are 
consistent with the findings of other research. For example, Choi and Choi (2009) have 
shown that the effect of exchange rate changes on exports and imports has diminished since 
2000. This is partly due to a significant weakening in the exchange rate pass-through effect 
for export products, as more intermediate goods are outsourced globally. Kim and Kwark 
(2009) have likewise shown that the effect of exchange rates on exports and investment has 
weakened significantly since the Asian financial crisis. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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2.3  Behind the current account trends: Dollar recycling 
mechanism through the services account deficit 
It remains unclear if Korea’s current account imbalance should be regarded as something 
serious; on average, the imbalance has only amounted to a small percentage of GDP (Table 
1), and had in fact been narrowing until the global financial crisis hit in 2008. However, 
merely focusing on the magnitude of the current account would be missing the structural 
problems which have caused the imbalance in the first place. 
Figure 5 shows that there has been a clear shift in the composition of the current account 
balance. Before 1997–1998, the goods and services accounts moved in the same direction. 
Shortly after the Asian financial crisis, however, the services account started moving in the 
opposite direction of the goods account. From 1999 to 2009, the accumulated goods 
account  had a surplus  of  US$283.8 billion, while the services account had  a deficit of 
US$117.3 billion. In other words, 41.34% of the goods account surplus has been offset by 
the services account deficit. 













































Note: Seasonally adjusted data. 
Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
This can be regarded as a kind of dollar recycling mechanism, and could partly explain why 
the appreciation in the won did not reach levels where net exports would disappear. This 
mechanism works as follows: the goods account surplus pushes up the value of the won, 
inducing Korean firms and households to buy more foreign services; this widens the services 
account deficit, and keeps the value of the won from  appreciating  as much.  Granger 
causality tests (Table 4) confirm that the services account deficit follows the goods account 
surplus, and not the other way around. 
What kind of services brought about the deficit in the services account? Figure 6 shows that 
travel and other business services account for most of the deficit. Travel includes not just 
tourism but also the money that goes to Koreans studying  overseas. Other business 
services consist of merchant and other trade-related services; advertising; legal, accounting, 
and consulting services; and services between related enterprises. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Table 4: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests for Net Exports and Services Account 
Balance 
Sample: 1980M01 2009M11 
Lags: 2     
       
         Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Prob.  
       
         SERVICES does not Granger Cause NX   357   1.07212  0.3434 
 NX does not Granger Cause SERVICES   16.2723  2.E-07 
       
        Source: Authors' calculations. 










2006Q1 2006Q3 2007Q1 2007Q3 2008Q1 2008Q3 2009Q1 2009Q3
Balance of transportation Balance of Travel
Balance of communications services Balance of construction services
Balance of Insurance Services Balance of financial services
Balance of computer and information services Balance of Royalties and License fees
Balance of other business services Balance of personal, cultural, and recreational services
Balance of Government services, n.i.e
 
Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
The correlation between the goods account surplus and services account deficit may reflect 
a basic structural problem in the Korean economy: the weakness of the services sector, 
such as education and business services. If the services sector had been strong enough, 
domestic demand as a percentage of GDP would have been larger, and Korea would not 
have had to rely so much on the external sector. The services account deficit would have 
been smaller, while the goods account surplus would not have been so large. 
This points to another kind of imbalance in the economy: the imbalance between the goods 
sector and the services sector. This imbalance is reflected not only in the external accounts 
but also in the internal imbalance in domestic industries, as will be discussed in section 5. 
3.  SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT IMBALANCES  
Savings and investment imbalances mirror the overall trend in the current account. In Korea, 
the saving-investment imbalance emerged only after the Asian financial crisis. Before the 
crisis, Korea’s investment was generally larger than its savings  (Figure 7), resulting in 
current account deficits. Indeed, in the 20 years before the crisis, the current account had 
surpluses in only five  years:  from  1986  to  89, and  in  1993 (Figure 8). In 2008,  Korea’s 
current account once again turned negative. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
Between  1998  and  2007,  Korea had a  current account surplus which reflected savings 
surpassing investment; however, this surplus began to decrease as savings declined and 
investment stagnated.  
3.1  Stagnating investment 
Gross investment in Korea slipped from 37.8% of GDP in 1996 to 25.0% in 1998, reflecting 
the harsh impact of the Asian financial crisis on the economy. In 1998, corporate investment 
as a share of GDP fell by nearly 10.0 percentage points from its pre-crisis rate of 25.0% 
(Figure 9). It continued to hover below 20.0% of GDP until 2007. By 2008, private investment 
had returned to pre-crisis levels, reflecting the restructuring of firms and the economy in 
response to the Asian financial crisis. In 2009, however, the gross investment rate fell again, 
as the adverse effects of the global financial crisis filtered through the economy. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Sources: Bank of Korea; CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
 
Figure 9: Composition of Gross Investment (% of GDP) 
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Note: 2008 private investment estimated based on distribution during the previous three years. 
Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
The Asian Development Outlook 2009 (ADB 2009) has identified a number of factors which 
may have depressed investments  after the Asian financial  crisis. First, post-crisis 
restructuring and reform, including the working out of pre-crisis investment excesses, may 
have slowed down investment. Prior to the crisis, investment generally exceeded savings in 
Korea—a trend which was not unique to Korea. However, compared to the other crisis-ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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affected economies—Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand—the gap between Korea's 
investment and savings rates was relatively small before 1997 (Figure 7). Therefore, the 
significance of pre-crisis overinvestment in Korea remains an open question. 
Second, the Asian financial crisis may have heightened the risks facing regional investors, 
causing them to shy away from further investment in the region. Using the risk ratings of the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Figure 10 shows that Korea's overall risk score increased 
rapidly during the Asian financial crisis, reflecting heightened risks in the country's economic 
policy, structure, and liquidity. By the first quarter of 2005, the overall risk score had reverted 
to its 1997 level;  investment rates have since  remained steady as risk scores have 
stabilized. The EIU revised its rating methodology in the second quarter of 2006, and up until 
the third quarter of 2008, classified Korea as low risk (minor adjustments have been made in 
the ratings for Korea since the end of 2008). This may have contributed to the pick up in 
investment in 2008, which could very well have continued had the global financial crisis not 
erupted. 











1997Q1 1998Q1 1999Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2004Q1 2005Q1 2006Q1
 
Source: EIU Country Risk.  
Third, shortcomings in the investment climate may have weakened investment during the 
post-crisis period. While Korea's overall ranking in the World Bank Doing Business Surveys 
is high compared to many other Asian countries, it figures relatively low in specific areas of 
the survey. In particular, out of about 180 countries, Korea ranks below 50 on starting a 
business, employing workers, registering property, and protecting investors. This could be a 
valid reason for slower investment, post-crisis. 
Fourth, in recent years, the capital intensity of East Asian products has declined as industry 
structures have shifted to more skill- and knowledge-intensive sectors, such as information 
technology products and services. This industry upgrading has also contributed to weaker 
investment demand (Lee and Mckibbin 2007). 
Fifth, since the marginal product of capital has been declining, it has become difficult to 
guarantee a higher rate of profit for physical capital investment. Since the 1990s, Korea's 
average product of capital—which is proportional to the marginal product of capital if a Cobb-
Douglas production function is assumed—has been lower than that of the US (Figure 11). 
This  implies  that the decline in investment is not only a short-term problem,  but also a 
structural one that has persisted for many years. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Source: Authors' calculations using Penn World Table 6.2 (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/). 
Sixth, increasing openness in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has  made it an 
attractive investment destination, particularly because of its large and cheap labor force and 
huge market potential. This may have shifted investment away from other Asian economies, 
including Korea. Figure 12 shows net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Korea and 
the PRC since 1998. Immediately after the Asian financial crisis, net FDI flows to Korea 
rapidly increased until about 2000, perhaps due to the  large number of mergers and 
acquisitions as firms consolidated in the post-crisis period. In contrast, FDI inflows to the 
PRC remained somewhat stable (barring seasonality factors) during the same period. Since 
2006,  however,  net FDI inflows to Korea have slowed, while flows to the PRC have 
continued to grow rapidly. Nonetheless, it is possible that the FDI boom in the PRC may be 
unrelated to the FDI decline in Korea, given differences in the industrial structure of the two 
economies. Further analysis is required to determine whether the influx of FDI to the PRC is 
hurting FDI inflows to Korea. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
3.2  Declining savings 
The decline in gross investment rates has been accompanied by a similar drop in gross 
savings rates, which fell from 36.6% in 1998 to 30.7% in 2008 due to a dramatic decrease in 
personal savings. Personal savings collapsed from 18.5% of GDP in 1998, to about 5% 
between 2006 and 2008; the net personal savings rate
5
                                                 
5  The net personal savings rate is the ratio between personal net saving and personal net disposable income. 
This excludes subsidies, taxes, social burdens and benefits, and other transfers from both gross saving and 
gross disposable income.  
 was roughly 2.5% in 2008 (Figure 
13). In contrast, corporate savings rose steadily and government savings remained robust in 
the same period. As such, Korea’s surplus has consisted mainly of corporate and public 
savings. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
This trend notwithstanding, aggregate private savings in Korea have remained durable due 
to a number of factors. First, rapid economic expansion and income growth in Korea has 
been accompanied by an increase in savings.
6
                                                 
6 Studies have shown that richer countries tend to save more than poorer countries, and faster-growing countries 
tend to save more than slower-growing countries. For example, Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2002) have shown 
that high growth leads to high saving in a habit formation setting where current consumption is determined by 
past consumption. 
 Figures 14 and 15 plot Korea's savings rate 
and per capita GDP from 1970 to 2008. Although the relationship between per capita GDP 
growth and savings rates is not very evident from Figure 14, Figure 15 clearly shows that the 
savings rate has increased along with per capita income, albeit at a decreasing rate. In fact, 
the savings rate has been declining slowly since 2004. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
Second, increased risk and uncertainty seem to have increased precautionary savings by 
firms. In the aftermath of the Asian financial  crisis, Korean corporations seem to have 
learned the lessons of excessive leverage, consequently  cutting  back on spending and 
setting aside more funds for future use. Indeed, the leverage ratios of Korean firms have 
declined dramatically post-crisis. Total borrowings and bonds payable of manufacturing firms 
reached 50.1% of total assets in 1998; by 2008, this ratio had fallen to about 26.3% of total 
assets. Debt ratios (defined as the ratio of total liabilities to stockholders' equity) of 
manufacturing firms have also declined substantially, from over 300% to about 100% in the 
same period. This could explain the rising corporate savings rate. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Source: Authors' calculations from CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
Third, demographic transition may have influenced individuals' motives to save. The life-
cycle hypothesis posits that individuals save during their working years and spend their 
savings after retirement. A high old-age dependency ratio implies that the number of 
dissavers is rising relative to the number of savers, thus reducing aggregate savings. 
Meanwhile, a high youth dependency ratio implies that the working-age population has to 
support a growing number of young children, thus reducing their capacity to save. Higher 
dependency ratios also hurt public savings. Spending for social services for the youth and 
the elderly, coupled with a lower tax base due to a smaller workforce, implies a reduction in 
public savings. Korea’s population is rapidly ageing, with the mean age at 37.5 years in 
2009, up nearly 5 years over the 10-year period from 1999 (Figure 16). However, while the 
old-age dependency ratio has been rising, the youth dependency ratio has been declining, 
so that the overall dependency rate has remained relatively stable over the last 15 years. 
The dependency rate was constant between 1999 and 2004, but has since declined slowly. 
According to the life-cycle hypothesis, savings rates should rise as dependency rates fall. 
However, this has not been the case for Korea since 2004. This may be because the rising 
old-age dependency ratio has  had a much larger impact on savings rates than the 
decreasing youth dependency ratio, as found in Kim and Lee (2007). 
A fourth factor which may have influenced savings in Korea is the level of financial 
development,  the  impact  of which can go both ways (ADB 2009). The traditional view 
suggests that more developed financial sectors induce higher savings by creating deeper 
and more sophisticated financial systems. The alternative view sees them reducing the 
precautionary motive for saving. The relationship between financial development and 
savings in Korea remains unclear. 
Is Korea therefore saving “too much” or investing “too little”? The preceding discussion has 
been unable to provide strong evidence of oversaving or underinvestment. More rigorous 
econometric analysis is needed to categorically explain savings and investment behavior in 
the country. From 1998 up until 2008, Korea's savings have been higher than investment. 
While both the savings and investment rates have not returned to pre-crisis levels reached in 
1996, investment seems to be lagging savings, suggesting ample room for a future rise in 
investment. Increasing investment will raise productive capacity, allowing the economy to ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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grow faster in succeeding periods. However, to get a clearer view of the underlying causes 
of Korea's external imbalances, a closer look at domestic distortions and structural problems 
is necessary. 
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Source: Korean Statistical Information Service (http://www.kosis.kr/eng/index.html). 
4.  EXPORT-LED GROWTH AND EXTERNAL IMBALANCES 
The roots of Korea's export orientation predate the Asian financial crisis. In the early 1960s, 
the country shifted its economic policy from import-substitution to export-orientation to 
support growth. Although the import-substitution policy was not completely abandoned, the 
government  began  providing  incentives to exporting firms based on their export 
performance. The exposure to international export markets compelled industries to become 
more efficient, and spurred significantly faster economic growth.  
In the early 1970s, government policy reverted to import-substitution, favoring 
conglomerates to build up heavy and chemical industries. This policy shifted again with a 
change in regime in the 1980s, following the deregulation of the trade and financial sectors. 
Capital account liberalization followed in the 1990s, giving firms easy access to short-term 
foreign debt that raised their leverage to unsustainable levels and eventually contributed to 
the 1997–1998 financial crisis. 
As the crisis ensued, domestic demand languished, prompting even greater emphasis on 
export promotion. Since then, Korea has increasingly relied on external demand to drive 
growth. Exports accounted for 27.7% of GDP in 1996, but this share had increased rapidly to 
52.9% by 2008 (Figure 17). Similarly, imports shot up from 30.4% of GDP to 54.1% during 
the same period. Preliminary figures for 2009 suggest that these trade shares have declined 
somewhat,  although they remain  substantial:  for the first nine months of 2009, exports 
accounted for 50.4% of GDP, while imports amounted to 45.8%. These developments make 
the Korean economy even more vulnerable to the global business cycle. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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*Data for 2009 refer to the first three quarters only. 
Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
Increased reliance on external demand was abetted by the sharp devaluation in the won 
following the Asian financial crisis. From an average of W804/US$1 in 1996, the exchange 
rate depreciated by 42.7% to W1,403/US$1 in 1998. Although  the won has appreciated 
since, it has not returned to the nominal levels registered in 1996. However, the real effective 
exchange rate recovered to its pre-crisis level in 2005 and surpassed this level until 2008, 
when the won depreciated again in the face of the global financial crisis (Figure 18). 
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Sources: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp); Bloomberg.  ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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The weaker won may have encouraged exports to some extent. In general, exports increase 
as the value of the real effective exchange rate falls (Figure 19). The empirical analysis in 
Section 2 confirms this relationship, although the magnitude of the impact of the exchange 
rate becomes unclear if the two crisis periods are excluded. 





































Sources: Staff calculations from DOTS; BIS (http://www.bis.org/statistics/eer/index.htm); CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
Along with the depreciation of the won, growth in the  global  economy  further  bolstered 
Korean exports, allowing the accumulation of massive foreign exchange reserves. These 
reserves ballooned to US$265.2 billion by the end of 2009, from just US$32.4 billion at the 
end of 1996 (see Figure 2). As a proportion of GDP, Korea's foreign exchange holdings 
swelled from 5.7% to 32.8% during the same period. 
Despite the rapid build up in foreign exchange reserves, some economists in Korea continue 
to argue for a further build up in reserves, to perhaps a minimum of US$300 billion. For 
example, Kim, Lee, and Lim (2010) have argued that Korea’s reserves should have been 
somewhere between US$232.3 billion and US$326.9 billion in March 2009,  when actual 
reserves were only US$206.3 billion. This thinking may reflect Korea’s recent experience 
with the foreign exchange crisis that followed the global financial crisis. Indeed, the won 
depreciated by 38.8% in wake of the crisis, from around W939/US$1 on 1 March 2008 to 
W1,534/US$1 by 1 March 2009. 
Massive foreign exchange reserves, however, entail some costs. A specific cost of keeping 
excess reserves is the forgone return from holding them in low-yielding, safe, and liquid 
assets such as US government bonds, rather than in higher-yielding assets (ADB 2009). 
While large foreign exchange holdings may help countries recover quickly from currency 
crises, they cannot insulate countries  from such crises in the future.  Moreover, the 
opportunity costs of holding excess foreign reserves in low-yielding, safe, and liquid assets 
are significant.
7
Perhaps the more important issue is  whether Korea should change its export-oriented 
growth strategy. The economy's current industry structure seems to require sustained export 
  
                                                 
7  A recent study by Park (2008) estimates that the benefits of more actively managing excess reserves are 
greater than 1% of GDP in many Asian countries. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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orientation; the semiconductor, motor vehicle, shipbuilding, electronics, and steel industries 
require ever-growing  foreign  markets. These sectors managed to expand even after the 
Asian financial crisis. The domestic economy's inability to fully absorb the increasing outputs 
of these sectors has necessitated the exploration of larger export markets. Stagnating global 
demand, however, cannot assure a continued market for Korea's export products. This issue 
takes on greater urgency in the current global environment, where recovery remains fragile, 
and demand from industrial countries cannot be relied on. Another key challenge is 
competition from the PRC's manufacturing sector, which is gradually shifting to higher value 
added goods that directly compete with Korea's exports. 
The export sector's expansion has tended to overwhelm domestic sectors and small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the post-Asian financial crisis period. Moreover, with 
the trend toward globalization, big firms in the export sector  are  increasingly relying  on 
foreign intermediate goods and services  to exact  efficiency gains. This shift has been 
unfavorable to  SMEs, which now face increasing global competition. The profitability of 
SMEs has been eroded by their weak market power. 
Overall, Korea's export-oriented growth strategy allowed it to recover swiftly from the Asian 
crisis, and facilitated its transformation into a surplus economy, or a net capital exporter from 
1998 through 2007. However, the very same strategy made the country very vulnerable to 
the 2008–2009 global crisis. Over-reliance on external demand made Korea susceptible to a 
sharp fall in the industrial countries' appetite for imported goods. As a result, Korea's 
economic growth began declining in the first quarter of 2008, and bottomed out in the first 
quarter of 2009. The large declines in Korea's exports resulted in three quarters of economic 
contraction that finally ended in the second quarter of 2009.  
These developments highlight the need for Korea to reduce its dependence on export- 
driven  growth. A rebalancing of the economy toward more diversified sources of growth 
needs to be prioritized. 
5.  INTERNAL IMBALANCES BETWEEN MANUFACTURING 
AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES  
As noted in Section 2.3, the imbalance between the manufacturing and services sectors is 
reflected in the behavior of the goods and services accounts. The weakness in the services 
sector is also reflected in its labor productivity trends. Table 5 shows that the employment 
share of services has been increasing over time—from 34.3% in 1970 to 65.2% in 2005. 
However, services’ share of value added has not been increasing at the same rate, rising 
from 44.29% to only 58.96% during the same period (Figure 20).
8 This means that the labor 
productivity of the services sector has been decreasing over time. An analysis by Lee 
(2005),  has shown that  while  the manufacturing industry has enjoyed high productivity 
growth over the past few decades, Korean service industries including finance, insurance, 
real estate, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and restaurants and hotels sectors have 
had low productivity growth.
9
The weakness in the services sector can be attributed to both knowledge intensive 
services—in particular, education and business services—and traditional services. 
 
                                                 
8  These figures are for current prices. If constant prices are used, the changes in services’ share become even 
smaller.  
9 Lower productivity growth in the service sector relative to the manufacturing sector has been established since 
the seminal paper by Baumol (1967). Increasingly unbalanced growth across sectors induces labor force 
reallocation toward stagnant sectors, which might eventually slow down aggregate GDP growth. The fact that 
the Korean service industries have had relatively lower productivity growth is therefore  not extraordinary. 
Nonetheless, the  labor productivity growth differential between services and manufacturing has been much 
larger in Korea compared to other industrialized economies (see Lee 2005). ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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Table 5: Employment Share of Services Industry in Korea 
  1970  1980  1990  1995  2000  2005 
Services  34.3  38.6  47.7  54.8  61.2  65.2 
Manufacturing  14.2  22.7  27.9  23.6  20.3  18.5 
Others  51.5  38.7  24.4  21.6  18.5  16.3 
Sources: OECD (http://www.oecd.org/statsportal) and Korean Statistical Information Service 
(http://www.kosis.kr/eng/index.html). 


















































Note: Left figure is for constant prices and the right one is for current prices. 
Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp) 
5.1  Education and business services: shortage and poor quality of 
supply  
In education and business services, which are directly reflected in current account balances, 
the problem lies in the shortage and poor quality of supply. Although the shares of education 
and business services in value added have been increasing in nominal terms, these shares 
have actually been declining in real terms (i.e., increases have been mainly due to rising 
prices). From 1995 to 2008, education’s share in value added increased from 4.94% to 
6.52% in current prices but decreased from 6.97% to 5.80% in constant prices. Business 
services give a similar picture: value added in current prices increased from 3.98% to 5.42%, 
but decreased from 4.97% to 4.87% in constant prices during the same period.  
Korea’s education problem is very complicated, and goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, the huge number of Koreans studying abroad suggests that Korea’s education 
services cannot meet domestic demand. Korean students comprise the bulk of overseas 
students in the US (127,185  students  in 2008, or 14.8% of the total),  Canada (27,549 
students in 2005, or 15.4% of the total), and PRC (80,000 students). The story is similar in 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Given the size of Korea’s 
population—about 50 million—these  levels are  rather surprising,  and it is not difficult to 
guess how much money goes to these overseas students. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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The supply of business services has likewise been insufficient. In terms of value added, 
business services comprised only 5.6% of GDP in 2005, compared to 11.5% in the US, and 
7.7% in Japan. Employment in business services gives a similar picture: 6.8% of workers are 
in Korea's business services sector, compared to 11.7% in the US and 10.5% in Japan. 
5.2  Traditional services: shortage of demand 
While the supply of traditional services is more than sufficient, labor productivity is relatively 
low. The productivity of the wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels sectors was 
only 22% of producer services in 2003. The productivity of social and personal services was 
also very low, amounting to only 43% of producer services. This is due to too much supply 
and too little demand. 
The excess supply of traditional services arose from efforts to restructure the economy after 
the financial crisis. Most of the workers who were laid off shifted to the services industry, 
opening small restaurants and laundry shops, or becoming taxi drivers. For example, the 
employment share of restaurants and hotels sector increased from 9.46% in 1995 to 10.6% 
in 2008, while its share in value added (in current prices) decreased from 2.65% to 2.39%.  
Meanwhile, the shortage of demand for traditional services has a lot to do with the declining 
income share of households. The share of households and private unincorporated 
enterprises in national income fell from 74.20% in 1996 to 64.09% in 2008 (Figure 21). This 
drop of about 10 percentage points in household income has eroded the most important 
basis for domestic consumption. 
Figure 21: Households and Private Unincorporated Enterprises 

























Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
6.  POLICY AGENDA: REBALANCING GROWTH 
The preceding discussions have highlighted the internal factors that influence Korea's 
external imbalances. However, the degree of influence varies across the different factors. In 
terms of the saving-investment imbalance, evidence of either underinvestment or oversaving 
remains inconclusive;  the lower savings and investment rates may even  be the new ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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equilibrium levels based on the economy's fundamentals and income level. What is certain is 
that the declining gap between savings and investment contributed to the narrowing of 
Korea's current account imbalances, prior to the global financial crisis of 2008. 
The adoption of export-oriented policies does not seem to have strongly influenced Korea's 
external imbalances, since the exchange rate is flexible and adjusts to prevailing market 
conditions. Nevertheless, export-promotion policies have created domestic distortions. In 
particular, export-promotion policies have  encouraged more investment in manufacturing 
relative to services, creating an imbalance between the two sectors. Productivity and the 
quality and quantity of investment in services are low. As a result, Korea is heavily reliant on 
services imports. 
Given these challenges, what policy measures should Korea adopt to ensure balanced and 
sustained growth for its economy? 
6.1  The potential role of the exchange rate 
Korea’s external imbalance does not seem to be persistent. An artificial adjustment in the 
exchange rate may not be necessary, since the exchange rate is fairly flexible (Figure 22) 
and is likely to remain so, given that the government has not intervened to influence the 
exchange rate since the Asian financial crisis. Although some policymakers may want to 
manipulate the value of the won, such efforts are bound to fail since Korea’s capital market 
is almost perfectly open to foreign investors. 
Figure 22: Volatility of the Value of Currencies 
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Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
Figure 23 shows a marked shift in Korea’s capital account after the Asian financial crisis. On 
occasion, the capital account has tended to move together with the current account. This 
movement amplifies the behavior of exchange rates: when the exchange rate depreciates, it 
tends to go too far, and when it appreciates, it tends to move too fast. Moreover, the sheer 
magnitude of the capital account imbalance sometimes increases the volatility of  the 
exchange rate. For example, in the fourth quarter of 2008, the capital account deficit reached 
about 25% of GDP, leading to a rapid depreciation in the won. ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
 
25 
Under the current circumstances, manipulating the won is virtually impossible. The results of 
the empirical analyses have further shown that the effect of exchange rates on net exports is 
limited. In addition, the real exchange rate that decides the current account balance is an 
endogenously-determined relative price that adjusts to clear markets in response to shocks 
(Eichengreen 2010). 






































Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp). 
6.2  Intra-regional integration 
Korea must enhance its resilience to external shocks by broadening the scope and structure 
of its openness, and fostering intra-regional trade, investment, and financial transactions. 
Fostering trade within the region will be necessary to reduce over-reliance on extra-regional 
demand. Although Korea's trade with the rest of developing Asia has been rising, its share in 
total trade has increased at a relatively slower pace in recent years (Figure 24). Between 
1990 and 1997, Korea's exports to the rest of the region more than doubled, increasing from 
16.7% to 37.3% of total exports. By 2008, however, intra-regional exports had risen to just 
44.7% of total exports. The slight uptick registered in the first half of 2009, to 46.7% of total 
exports, may just be a temporary effect of the global financial crisis. 
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Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
Strengthening intra-regional relationships can be mutually advantageous to Korea and its 
neighbors. Asia has a large savings pool that can be tapped for intra-regional investment. 
Considering that its investment has been stagnating, Korea could benefit from the increased 
availability of funding sources. The flipside of this is that Korea would also have wider 
options for investment. 
6.3  Fostering service sector productivity and domestic demand 
Corporate savings have been rising in Korea. Reducing corporate savings and raising the 
corporate investment rate, particularly in the services industry, may help reduce  internal 
imbalances if these  foster restructuring within the services sector and raise the sector's 
productivity. Although the services sector's share in the total economy has been gradually 
diminishing in real terms, it still remains the largest sector in the economy.  
Nevertheless, the country remains heavily reliant on services imports. Since records started 
in 1980, surpluses in the services account have only been recorded during 1982–1989, and 
in 1998. Business services other than transportation and financial services account for the 
bulk of the deficits in the last few years.  
Korea needs to further develop its services sector  in order to shift  to a domestically-
supported growth strategy. This issue is more complex than it seems, since the low 
productivity of the services industry is closely related to  massive  hidden unemployment 
created by  economic  restructuring  after  the Asian financial  crisis.  Moreover,  raising the 
demand for traditional services will require improvements in the share of household income. 
Since 88% of workers were employed by SMEs as of 2005, promoting investment in SMEs 
will be critical. 
In order to raise investment rates, the productivity of investment will have to be improved. 
Raising the productivity of SME investment, particularly in the services industry where about 
70% of workers are employed, will be important to rebalancing the Korean economy both 
internally and externally. This will require a reduction in widespread entry barriers in 
knowledge services, and reforms to address the inefficient structure of traditional services. 
Investments in knowledge services such as education and business services should focus 
more on how to cope with growing global competition,  while investments in traditional ADBI Working Paper 224    Ha, Lee and Sumulong 
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services should focus primarily on industry  restructuring,  as well as  reallocating  excess 
workers to productive sectors. 
The emergence of a large and rapidly growing urban middle class will be crucial to increase 
domestic demand. The expansion of the middle class will hinge on the dynamism of 
enterprises, especially SMEs. Increasing investment by SMEs will help reduce the internal 
imbalance between savings and investment.  
Further improvements in  the investment climate are necessary to  encourage  greater 
investment and boost domestic demand. The upgrade in Korea’s Doing Business (World 
Bank 2010) ranking for 2010 is largely due to improvements in business startup procedures. 
Specifically, the number of procedures and number of days required to start a business have 
been reduced. The minimum capital requirement and cost of starting a business have 
likewise been cut. The effects of these changes are expected to positively affect investment 
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